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Introduction: 
Hitherto, it was assumed that the Communists in Yugoslavia with Josip Broz “Tito” on top gave their 
state security service straight orders to liquidate certain political opponents abroad.1 However, in 
light of the primary sources presented here, this assumption needs to be reassessed. This essay 
deals with targeted killings organized by Yugoslav state security services and the influence of the 
political leadership on these measures.2 Largely based on contemporary sources, it also highlights 
the logic behind the violent acts. Especially documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and the U.S. State Department, which were released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 
late 2016 and early 2017, help us to shed new light on this topic. Since targeted killings abroad are 
an issue also relating to other countries (for instance the United States of America),3 the 
peculiarities of the Yugoslav case are brought to the open. This can provide the basis for a 
comparative approach. The study starts with a brief outline of the Yugoslav state security. 
 
1. Early Development and Enemies of the State Security (1944-66) 
The origin of the Yugoslav state security is usually dated back to the 13th May 1944, the day the 
Department for the Protection of the People was set up. It was transformed into the Administration 
of State Security (Uprava državne bezbednosti, UDB or colloquial “UDBA”) in 1946. After several 
adjustments, from 1963-67 the UDB was finally decentralized. This process paralleled the general 
trend in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), where the autonomous decision-making 
of the six component republics was considerably increased after 1963.4 The UDB was part of the 
state secretariat of the interior, since 1945 headed by Tito’s close comrade Aleksandar Ranković, a 
Serb who had the reputation of having a tough hand against all kinds of “enemies of the people”. In 
the late 1950s Ranković changed from the head of the interior to other government posts. 
In the 1960s Yugoslavia entered a phase of liberalization, which was especially underpinned by 
the strengthening of self-administration. Ranković was regarded as an impediment to 
decentralization. Through his personal network from the time when he had been on top of the 
Interior Ministry, it was assumed, he still exerted a strong influence over the UDB, thus hindering 
the development of self-administration in all areas of public life. He was accused of being 
responsible for spying on high party members and even wiretapping Tito’s private rooms. In July 
1966, at the fourth plenum of the Central Committee, he was ousted from his political posts. 
Whatever the real reasons were, Ranković’s loss of power gave a strong signal. He was seen as 
representing Serbian national interests and pulling the strings against his comrades.5 Top officials of 
the federal and Serbian UDB were dismissed.6 Ranković also impersonated the episode when the 
UDB had suppressed the Yugoslav Stalinists (even though many of them on false suspicions) with 
Stalinist methods.7 According to the Stalinist scheme, at some point the cleanser himself had to be 
purged. Ivan Mišković, head of the military security service, played a key role in safeguarding the 
dismissal of Ranković and his followers. In the early 1970s, however, when Mišković apparently 
started to mingle in the sensitive area of foreign affairs, he also lost his post. 
At the end of the Second World War and thereafter, many anti-Communists from Croatia, 
Serbia and other parts of Yugoslavia fled their homeland or stayed abroad as Displaced Persons. As 
adherents of military groups and oppositional organizations, they posed a threat to the Partisan 
government.8 With the consolidation of the Socialist state this problem became less virulent. In the 
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late 1940s the attention of the politicians in Belgrade shifted to the emigration of pro-Moscow 
Yugoslavs in Eastern Europe (the so-called informbirovci). While Tito sided with the West, the 
prospects of anti-Communist Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian and Macedonian exiles benefiting from 
the Cold War situation diminished. In the late 1950s especially the Croatian anti-Yugoslav emigration 
was reinforced by younger refugees. Some of them had been active in militant nationalist groups, 
others left Yugoslavia for economic reasons. Often both motives intermingled. At the same time 
Ante Pavelić, ex-dictator of the Axis-allied wartime regime in Croatia, founded the Croatian 
Liberation Movement (Hrvatski oslobodilački pokret, HOP) a more or less implicit reference to the 
People’s Liberation Movement (Narodno-oslobodilački pokret: NOP), as the Communist-led anti-
Fascist resistance during the Second World War was called.9 HOP served as an umbrella for Ustaša-
inclined organizations like the United Croatians in West Germany. They recruited new members 
among the refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), where many of them went to get a 
job on the prospering labour market. The FRG was also attractive for political reasons. Since Tito re-
established friendly relations with the Soviet sphere in the late 1950s, the government in Belgrade 
recognized the East German state. As a reaction, the FRG broke off its diplomatic relations with 
Yugoslavia. This development, in addition to the anti-Communist climate in the FRG, created 
favourable conditions for the exiles, because it brought along a weakening of Yugoslavia’s position.10 
On these grounds the FRG started to grant asylum to political refugees from Yugoslavia. 
Some hotheads among the newcomers were tired of the internal fractions and of limiting 
themselves to rituals like the annual celebration of the 10th April, when the collaborationist Ustaša 
state had been proclaimed in 1941. They demanded action instead. Croatian and to a lesser extent 
Serbian ultranationalists founded militant secret organizations in western countries like Australia or 
the FRG. In late 1962, a group of neo-Ustaše attacked the Yugoslav state representation near Bonn, 
setting the offices on fire.11 The house-keeper was shot on duty. In the summer of the following year 
three troikas of armed Croatian emigrants re-entered their homeland in order to conduct sabotage 
acts against Yugoslavia. The intruders, who belonged to the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood 
(HRB), were arrested before carrying out any of their planned assaults. Yugoslav representatives 
abroad were another target of frequent émigré aggression. While on visit in western states, 
politicians from Yugoslavia felt threatened by the open and sometimes frightening appearance of 
their opponent compatriots. Yugoslav propaganda pictured the adversaries abroad as bloodthirsty 
perverted Fascist thugs, an image that can perhaps best be seen in Miodrag Bulatovićs novel “The 
Four-Fingered People” (Ljudi sa četiri prsta). 
Already in 1962, the Yugoslav government tended to de-escalate by offering an amnesty for 
people who had illegally left the country but not committed any grave crime. However, this gesture 
failed to turn up significant results. Especially the adherents of extremist émigré organizations 
responded with cynical rejection. On the other hand, in face of rising unemployment the number of 
Yugoslav citizens who at least temporarily left their country in search for jobs remained high. Those 
who emigrated illegally constituted an easy prey for the older exiles who offered job opportunities 
and social integration.12 In response, the Yugoslav leadership eased the travel restrictions and 
opened the state borders for a controlled emigration to countries with a lasting demand of fresh 
labour force. In addition to the political measures, the Yugoslav state security focussed on the 
dangerous parts of the emigration. 
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2. Reforms and Structure after 1966: State Security Periphery as “Centre” 
The UDB, belonging to the ministry of the interior, was organized along the federal structure of the 
SFRY. Beyond its symbolic content, the fall of Ranković in 1966 brought fundamental changes to the 
state security.13 The reforms can be summarized as follows: 
- The state security was renamed from “administration” to “service”, thus emphasizing that it should 
not stand above the law.14 
- A governmental control commission was established.15 
- In order to avoid a concentration of power in Belgrade, the autonomy of the state security services 
of the republics was considerably strengthened.16 From now on it was accurate to speak of 
Yugoslavian security services in plural.17 
 
Each of the six component republics of the Yugoslav federation had its own state security 
organization. Below this level there existed state security “Centres” in the bigger towns. Bosnia-
Herzegovina had nine, Croatia around the mid-1970s seven of them, and in Slovenia at the 
beginning of the 1970s there were eight.18 Most of the field work was conducted by the “Centres”. 
Another relevant factor in Yugoslavia’s struggle against the hostile emigration was the secret service 
of the Foreign Ministry.19 Though this study deals with the Yugoslav state security service (Služba 
državne bezbednosti, SDB) in the first line, on occasions when it is unclear which part of the 
Yugoslav intelligence system was involved, collective terms will be used. 
On the one hand, the reform deprived the state security organs of any “executive functions”.20 
The basic task was to conduct preliminary investigations. On the other hand, they were entrusted 
with averting criminal acts aimed at undermining the official order of the SFRY.21 This principle was 
laid down in the updated rules of the state security, issued in early 1967, which defined the Yugoslav 
state security as an “autonomous professional service” for the collection of data with the aim of 
“discovering and preventing[!]” hostile activities.22 Towards officials of foreign states, Yugoslav 
representatives repeatedly asked for “preventative action against the extremist groups”.23 Following 
this demand, the security services started their own interventions. 
Of the few documents available on this issue, an operational plan of the State Security Centre in 
Split allows us to reconstruct the considerations of an employee who was concerned with curbing 
the anti-Yugoslav efforts of Tomislav Krolo. He was identified as a militant Croatian in West 
Germany, where he apparently took part in “diversionist training”. To the state security officer at 
the desk in Split it seemed unlikely that Krolo would cease his hostile activities by intrinsic 
motivation or change sides and work for the state security. Thus, the state security informed the 
public prosecutor in Split to take legal steps against Krolo. The chances, however, that this 
procedure would have an impact on a person outside the Yugoslav jurisdiction were tiny. But the 
security service still held one trump up the sleeve: “In the utmost case someone would, in relation 
to the opportunities, move towards the physical liquidation. For this plan we started operational 
combinations during the recent year.”24 
Though the plan to eliminate Krolo was not carried out, the Centre in Split arranged the killing of 
another Croatian militant in the FRG. Marijan Šimundić had been involved in organizing the failed 
attack of HRB combatants on Yugoslavia in summer 1963 and late that year he received a minor 
sentence for illegal firearms possession.25 To no surprise the Yugoslav security apparatus regarded 
4 
him as a potential danger.26 Šimundić was shot dead in an ambush-like setup near Stuttgart in 
September 1967. As indicated by SDB files, this operation was carried out by the State Security 
Centre in Split without the exact knowledge of the federal state security service in Belgrade (the SDB 
of the Savezni sekretarijat za unutrašnjih poslova, SSUP).27 
For the late 1960s, the CIA noted a high degree of confusion between the Yugoslav federation 
and its Republics over the “State Security Services’ command and control”.28 The significant 
reduction of personnel led to a marginalization of the SDB SSUP.29 The staff of the SDB was cut by 
half.30 Most affected was the federal SDB in Belgrade. As the SDB had lost its supervision,31 it was 
time to rebuild the position of the federal security service. Due to the far-reaching decentralization, 
the periphery decided over the future role of the former organizational centre. In the early 1970s, 
representatives of the Republic services conferred over the question of the hierarchy between 
Republics and the federation.32 The functions of the SDB SSUP were redefined.33 
 
3. Preventive Actions, Reactions and Taboo 
It is questionable if the control commission of the late 1960s was really able to supervise the work of 
the security services. At some point its competences consisted of receiving reports on the organized 
opposition against the socialist system.34 Beyond the missing grip on the state security, the 
intelligence services even seemed to turn against domestic politicians. In a “closed door session” of 
the Executive Bureau in March 1971, the inner circle of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
(LCY) investigated suspicions against “Yugoslav intelligence services […] that they were involved in a 
‘conspiracy’ aimed at slandering the present Croatian Republic leadership by linking it to radical 
foreign émigrés who advocate an independent Croatia”.35 The discussion quickly revealed 
dissatisfaction with the complicated situation for politicians who were confronted with the opaque 
intelligence system. Prime Minister Matija Ribičić was disappointed that the intelligence services 
denied the control commission access to important documents. He spoke of “frequent 
irregularities”. Under these circumstances, he concluded, an effective government control was 
impossible.36 
Before entering the LCY Executive Bureau in 1969, Stane Dolanc had been a member of the 
Slovenian control commission for state security matters.37 The CIA considered him particularly 
“sensitive to recent Western press coverage of Yugoslavia”.38 Against this background, he addressed 
the issue in the frankest way. First he pointed to the confusing multitude of autonomous security 
services plus the military intelligence and the exterior secret service. Of major concern to him, 
however, were the lethal foreign activities of the state security. This is his statement from the 
strictly confidential records of the Executive Bureau: 
„For me there is one situation beyond comprehension, totally unclear. The issue is liquidations. I 
think this here is the place where we can talk about this, that this will be investigated and checked 
who did this, how and why. All of you remember that we, the members of the [Executive] Bureau, at 
a session, I think a year ago, when I returned from [West] Germany and when I reported on the 
events and warnings I had received there […], because at that time an attempt was made on some 
Vukić, who they had tried to liquidate with a gas bomb, and when the Bureau, I think in unison, 
decided that nobody should get involved into such affairs, that this is a totally mistaken policy. 
However, thereafter these things still went on.”39 
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Among his closest comrades, Dolanc referred to the assassination attempt on Ante Vukić, president 
of the United Croats of Germany, an organization that the authorities of the FRG described as 
supportive of anti-Yugoslav violence.40 On 22 October 1969, Vukić and his family members 
discovered that the interior of their car was sprayed with a toxic substance. This incident was only 
one of many in the late 1960s. After the SDB had attributed the installation of six simultaneous time 
bombs at Yugoslav missions in the U.S. and Canada to an anti-Communist organization of Serbs,41 
Andrija Lončarić, a prominent figure in Serbian exile circles, was murdered in Paris on 6 March 1969. 
The investigators came across an “UDBA”-officer who had already returned to Belgrade. Ratko 
Obradović, editor of the Serbian “Iskra” émigré paper, was killed in Munich on 17 April 1969. Next 
was Sava Čubrilović, a member of the Serbian National Defense in Sweden. The major suspect 
quickly boarded a plane to Belgrade.42 
According to SDB sources, Hrvoje Ursa was attached to a group of HRB activists in Frankfurt.43 In 
late September 1968, he was found dead in a West German river.44 Milan Rukavina, the predecessor 
of Vukić on top of the United Croats, was shot together with two compatriots in his Munich office on 
26 October 1968. Yugoslav officials linked Rukavina to bomb attacks on public places in Belgrade.45 
Another casualty among Croatian exiles was Nahid Kulenović, founder of a militant anti-Yugoslav 
underground organization and sentenced by a West German court for violating the official 
restrictions on weapons.46 Traces that emerged after his death led the investigators of the Munich 
police to the Bosnian state security.47 On 9 April 1969, Mirko Čurić was also killed in Munich. Along 
with Rukavina and Kulenović, he had been registered on a “list of terrorists” compiled by the 
Yugoslav state security.48 
That the killings corresponded to the task of the security services to spare Yugoslavia from 
violent attacks, was confirmed by a statement of Ðuro Matošić, who had been a UDB officer in the 
latter half of the 1940s. As a member of the Croatian parliamentary committee for foreign relations 
he told a Yugoslav paper that the state security was “able to come to terms with the hostile 
activities of the emigration wherever it is necessary”.49 Obviously this referred to the foreign 
operations of the SDB (among others the assassination of the former concentration camp 
commander and militant neo-Ustaša leader Vjekoslav Luburić in Spain).50 Quoted in the 
international press, the message that had slipped Matošić’s tongue spread around the globe.51 
Through their diplomatic channels, Yugoslav politicians received reports on the public and official 
suspicions in western countries against their state security organs.52 This was one reason why, 
according to an internal CIA bulletin, the LCY leadership stressed “the need for more efficient 
control” over the work of the state security.53 
Despite Dolanc’s objections against the sensational foreign operations, further assassination 
attempts were made on exiles like the prominent Branimir Jelić,54 who was regarded by the Yugoslav 
Foreign administration “as one of the organizers and inspirers of diversionist-terrorist actions in 
Europe”.55 Recent aggressions of Croatian militants (e.g. the killing of the Yugoslav ambassador to 
Sweden in April 1971) gave drastic measures a justification. In a conversation with Soviet leader 
Leonid Brežnev, however, Tito advocated for the lawful treatment of political enemies: “After the 
war we didn’t cut anybody’s head anymore. We’ve finished what happened during the war. But 
after the war we didn’t do that, instead everything went before court.”56 
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Hence, it is doubtful if the state leader was in favour of killing opponents abroad. In any case, Dolanc 
who clearly criticized the lethal operations was elevated to the influential post of the Executive 
Bureau’s Secretary. After the inner circle of the Communist leadership had come to the conclusion 
that the political control over the secret services (including military and foreign intelligence) was 
insufficient, a second control body came into being: the Council for State Security Affairs. It was 
attached to the Presidency of the SFRY.57 One shortcoming of this body was, however, that a direct 
representation of the intelligence services was missing. At the first session, Dolanc recommended to 
tighten the leadership of the multiple services in the SFRY. Again, he complained about the 
reluctance of the republics’ services to report to the SDB SSUP or the tendency to withhold 
important information. He also spoke of an inefficient competition between the civil and military 
services. 
Whereas Dolanc addressed the actual problems, Secretary of the Interior Luka Banović warned 
of upcoming terror acts. Croatian militant émigrés, he reported, had large sums of money and 
explosives at their disposal. It seemed certain that an assault was imminent, but it was unclear 
exactly where and when. However, the security services took actions into their own hands. Banović 
presented a successful prevention of an attempt on the consul in Stuttgart. While using the official 
formula of bloody revenges among the exiles,58 he referred to the killing of Josip Senić in the night 
from 9th to 10th March 1972. Senić was officially known as an instructor and chief organizer of the 
HRB.59 A German court had sentenced him to three weeks in prison for the illegal possession of 
firearms. Actually, he was banned from re-entering the FRG when the police found him shot in the 
head while having been asleep.60 That the Yugoslav state security stood behind the murder, derives 
from a log entry of an operational consultation in Osijek of late May 1969, mentioning “the 
liquidation as the only appropriate measure” against Senić.61 Another strong indicator of Yugoslav 
state security involvement was the “detailed map” of Senić’s hideout delivered by an agent prior to 
the elimination.62 
 
4. “Special War”: The Geopolitical Context 
Though not totally unexpected, the attack came as a surprise: On 20 June 1972, 19 heavily armed 
anti-Yugoslav Croats crossed from Austria into Yugoslavia. Their plan was to stir up a rebellion in 
Croatia where a nationalist reform movement had been suppressed early that year. Guerrilla 
warfare was meant to spark the flame. The intruders reached central Bosnia, killing 13 members of 
Yugoslav forces before being stopped. Most of the combat took place in the Raduša region, giving 
the counterinsurgency operation its name. Though the efforts of the security apparatus had been 
enormous, it took the defenders more than four weeks to corner all the enemies.63 Confronted with 
this weak performance, the SDB declared the targeted killings abroad the spearhead of 
counterterrorism. An internal SDB paper, issued during the operation “Raduša”, implicitly admitted 
the violent acts in foreign countries and clearly corresponded to the disapproval from high ranking 
politicians like Dolanc: 
„The increase of aggressive methods against the emigration and the special missions of the SDB have 
been sharply criticized and subjected to investigation demands on grounds that they were ‘illegal’ 
work, that they could lead to ‘complications in international relations’ and that they would animate 
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the emigration to take revenge against our diplomatic and consular staff as well as other 
representatives abroad.”64 
 
Obviously aware of the delicate nature, the SDB stated that “some offensive actions of our service 
abroad” lowered the risk of further assaults.65 With the promise of handling the anti-terror 
measures “in a way that respects the political interests of the country and its international status”, 
the SDB tried to dispel the objections raised by Dolanc and his likeminded comrades.66 Alarmed by 
the fact that the guerrilla-style troublemakers had succeeded in penetrating deeply into the state 
territory, the political leadership provided a backup for the violent course of the SDB. The politicians 
with Tito on top interpreted the recent raid as part and proof of a “special war”.67 In their minds, 
Yugoslavia and the other non-aligned countries suffered from a subtle war waged by the 
superpowers, since both of them avoided a direct clash leading to mutual destruction by nuclear 
weapons. Triggered by the armed incursion, the identification with the Third World became the 
essence of the Yugoslav defence doctrine. Against this background, the militant exiles fought a proxy 
war that justified physical countermeasures.68 In the aftermath of the armed incursion, the 
interdepartmental task force entrusted the SDB with making “efforts for the destruction of any 
hostile intention and plan by all means available“.69 
A military style vocabulary euphemized the application of physical violence outside the state 
borders: “Through operations and other measures”, for instance, “the SDB managed to paralyze, 
smash, [and] temporarily or definitely stop the advancement” of Stipe Ševo, Gojko Bošnjak and Stipe 
Crnogorac.70 Crnogorac, a Croatian émigré in Austria, was certainly “paralyzed” while he was 
abducted and killed during the operation “Raduša”.71 In August 1972, the HRB-member Ševo was 
“definitely stopped” when he, his girlfriend and her nine-year-old daughter were shot on a road trip 
in northern Italy. Most likely the hit man was an agent of the Yugoslav state security.72 On 27 July 
1972, a bomb exploded in front of Bošnjak’s restaurant, obviously intended to “smash” the anti-
Yugoslav exile. Since this attempt failed and the SDB still regarded him as a terrorist, a second 
operation was mounted, this time trying to shoot him. However, the gunman from Bosnia was 
caught in the nick of time and ended up in a West German jail.73 Twenty years later, his contact 
person of the SDB Centre in Mostar testified on this incident.74 An official registry of the Bosnian 
SDB, listing Bošnjak as an operational case of the Mostar Centre, confirms this connection.75 
Among Yugoslav top politicians insecurity about a recurrence of armed incursions prevailed. On 
nationwide TV in April 1973, Tito stated “that any – and even the most insignificant – group of 
infiltrated enemies would be sought out and destroyed”.76 The scenario of a “special war” had a 
lasting impact on the state security.77 In the perception of security officials, their work consisted of 
resistance against a permanent global threat.78 Holding “an impassioned speech […] on the strength 
of the Yugoslav resistance to all interference from external sources ‘be they C.I.A. or Russian 
directed or misguided Yugoslavs’”, during a conference with Australian liaison officers Assistant 
Federal Secretary for Interior Josip Bukovac underlined the integral character of the “special war”.79  
While presiding over a session of the Executive Bureau in June 1973, Dolanc warned against an 
overreaction as he was of the opinion that “15, even 150 or 300 diversionists cannot wreck our 
socialist self-management progress in the country”. Only the existence of an inner enemy, he 
pointed out, allowed the attacks of foreign forces to gain strength. Thus, he advised to pay more 
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attention to the opponents inside the SFRY and even to deviations from the party line. For the 
situation abroad he recommended to focus on the hostile influences from the East.80 Corresponding 
to this proposal, Tito’s security advisor Ivan Mišković, according to CIA-sources “one of those who 
called loudest for vigilance against Western influences threatening Yugoslav security”, was ousted 
from his post.81 His dismissal paved the way for Franjo Herljević, another high ranking military man. 
Herljević, an active army general with an impressive wartime record, “was chosen as the new 
Federal Minister of Internal Affairs in May 1974 to effect closer coordination between military and 
civilian security services, and to supervise the organizational changes this would require”. After a 
revelation that the surveillance of pro-Soviet plotters had apparently been neglected, the SDB came 
under pressure. With the inauguration of Herljević, Tito demanded a closer cooperation of the 
intelligence system.82 Once the SDB SSUP had been marginalized, the state security was hard to get 
a grip on. Herljević, a Partisan veteran of strictly conservative leanings, was designated to introduce 
the required changes.83 
 
5. The Era of Franjo Herljević as Federal Secretary of the Interior 
The answer to the insufficient governance of the intelligence system emerged as another 
administrative patch. Out came the Federal Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. 
Rather than interfering in specific operations of Yugoslav security services, it adopted programmatic 
guidelines and provided surveys of the general security situation.84 The idea behind this body, 
established in February 1975, was to ensure a regular exchange between top politicians and the 
highest governmental representatives concerned with security matters.85 Already in March 1975, 
Herljević informed the state leadership that the “deviations” of the SDB were brought to an end. He 
presented the SDB as being “completely in line with the politics of the League of Communists and 
comrade Tito”.86 From an inner-Yugoslav perspective, the problem of a potential abuse of the secret 
police was mitigated by insisting on loyalty of the security services to the LCY. Demanding a 
confession to the party line was actually a result of the new constitution of 1974, reinforcing the 
power position of the LCY.87 Thus, ideological loyalty was placed above operational discipline. The 
question of political loyalty of the SDB remained high on the agenda as Vice-President Vladimir 
Bakarić, also the president of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, “warned a 
party plenum [in mid-1975] that the internal security organs might be growing too strong and 
independent”.88 
In 1974, the same year Herljević became chief of the SSUP, new training instructions with a 
strong accent on counterterrorism were released. If a judicial persecution was out of reach and a 
clear warning of a suspected person in vain, the instructions envisaged “the physical annihilation” as 
an appropriate ultimate step against “outlaws, terrorists, diversionists and alike”.89 Herljević gave 
the SDB a broad definition of terrorists as “all persons who in Yugoslavia or abroad are involved in 
the preparation [!], attempt or execution of diversionist-terrorist acts”.90 Furthermore, in view of an 
upcoming strike against Yugoslavia, the self-initiative of state security agents on the spot was 
explicitly welcomed. Such procedures, the instructions read, could apply tactics “of military nature”. 
“Exceptional situations” – as they had occurred “immediately after the war or at the time of the IB 
resolution [i.e. when Yugoslavia was ousted from the international Communist organization in 
1948]” – justified “liquidations”.91 
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For numerous dispersed groups of anti-Communist fighters the war was not over in May 1945. In 
the latter half of the 1940s, hundreds of armed bands resisted the country’s takeover by the 
Partisans.92 After the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, the neighbouring Socialist countries started a low scale 
war against Yugoslavia. Skirmishes at the borders occurred frequently.93 The incursion of summer 
1972 reminded the political leaders, especially Herljević who had been in command of the operation 
Raduša, of these experiences.94 With two Croatian intruders eliminated in the Velebit mountains, 
five Croats arrested in the FRG for illegal combat weapon deals, Franjo Turk of the HRB 
administering a Swiss bank account and Nikola Štedul forwarding money from overseas to 
nationalist extremists in Europe, anti-Yugoslav militancy still seemed on the rise in late 1974.95 
Immediately after Herljević had reminded the state security chiefs of Bosnia-Herzegovina in a 
session in June 1975 to avoid “international problems” as a result of “special actions”, he 
encouraged his audience to step up initiatives against the extremist emigration: “We cannot 
constantly cede the territory to the enemy, enabling him to maneuver, enabling him to act. For 
example there have been already some months, when we moved more aggressively against several 
groups of the enemy.”96 
At the same time Tito increased the fear of an approaching crisis with an update of the defence 
doctrine. By stating that “our country is permanently exposed to pressure and attacks of the 
external and internal enemy”, he declared a state of emergency towards Yugoslav government 
circles.97 So, first on Tito’s schedule after his holidays in summer 1975 was a meeting with all 
Yugoslav Secretaries for Internal Affairs. Herljević assessed the number of dangerous émigrés at 
5,000 and remarked that “the [state security] service carried out a series of actions which caused 
provocations resulting in conflicts, quarrels and mutual settlings of accounts in some extremely 
dangerous organizations and groups as well as among terrorists. Twelve infamous criminals from the 
ranks of the Ustasha and Chetnik extremists lost their lives, two have been severely injured – [Dane] 
Šarac in a desperate condition: paralyzed.”98 
The CIA described Šarac, an exile seriously harmed in an assassination attempt on 17 July 1975, 
as “one of the most active and influential representatives of extremist émigré circles in West 
Europe“, belonging to the “HRB members who were sentenced […] for bombings of Yugoslav 
installations in Germany between 1965 and 1968”.99 Being an infamous Ustaša convicted for war 
crimes, he was probably known to Herljević.100 At the departmental meeting in Belgrade, Herljević 
told the audience that specific actions for the stimulation of „further mutual settlings of accounts in 
the ranks of the extreme emigration” by the SDB were in the run.101 Internally Herljević (like his 
predecessor Banović) used the same coding as for the international public but noted the lethal 
incidents with satisfaction. It was also made clear that the violence was caused by the initiatives of 
the state security. However, in order to avoid legal disputes, the direct perpetration of the killings 
was attributed to the opposite side. After the update of the SDB manual in 1974, the killings of 
militant compatriots in foreign countries became programmatic.102 
Jakov Ljotić, a Serbian nationalist of extreme persuasion, was slain in his Munich apartment on 8 
July 1974. An active involvement of the Yugoslav state security, as in the other cases listed here, was 
likely.103 On 17 February 1975, the Croatian right-wing nationalist Nikica Martinović was shot in 
Klagenfurt. State security documents had expressed a particular interest in “paralyzing” 
Martinović.104 Mate Jozak, according to the internal documents of the SDB an emissary of “terror 
10 
organizers” in Australia with the task of arms procurement for a raid on Yugoslavia, was killed and 
his body dumped into the river Rhine in late 1974.105 After a designated hit man had surrendered to 
the Belgian police, presenting a silencer-equipped gun allegedly received from the SDB for killing 
Bora Blagojević, this exiled Chetnik leader was shot in Brussels on 8 March 1975.106 On 17 May 1975, 
“Petar Valić, editor of a Chetnik newspaper in Belgium, was shot in Brussels. Evidence suggests [that 
the] Yugoslav security service was responsible.”107 Ilija Vučić, once sentenced by a West German 
court for violating restrictions on explosives, died after being hit by five bullets in Stuttgart on 6 June 
1975.108 “Police suspected a terrorist team was dispatched from Yugoslavia for the purpose of killing 
him, but they had no proof”, concluded the CIA.109 SDB organs held the prominent Croatian exile 
leader Stipe Mikulić responsible for the explosion on board of a Yugoslav plane crashed over 
Czechoslovakia on 26 January 1972.110 Mikulić was killed in Sweden on 17 December 1975. The main 
suspect in police custody refused to give details on the origin of large monetary means in his 
possession – apparently the reward for the assassination – and eventually escaped to Yugoslavia.111 
Ongoing anti-Yugoslav violence triggered media campaigns against the host countries of the 
fanatical nationalists, stating that the latter received support from western intelligence agencies.112 
The Yugoslav government expected “urgent, energetic and persistent measures to stop terrorist 
activities by Fascist groups”.113 Due to the central position in south-eastern Europe, with the 
easement of travel restrictions Yugoslavia became an international transit country. Throughout 
1976, for instance, there were 106 million officially registered border crossings.114 During a 
consultation with Australian liaison officers, the Yugoslav representatives (actually SDB employees) 
pointed to the vulnerability of their state borders: 
„The Yugoslavs seemed confident that with the co-operation of Western European police forces (and 
Australia to a lesser extent at this stage) intelligence was keeping them up with the movements of 
hostile groups. They acknowledged however that they were dealing with clever people and that it 
was difficult for the Yugoslav police forces to adequately cope with the immense flow of traffic 
across their borders. It was always likely that small groups, or individuals, could ‘legally’ enter 
Yugoslavia.”115 
 
That the secretary-general of the HOP in France, Ivan Tuksor, was killed by a car bomb can be 
interpreted as a sign of growing nervousness inside the Yugoslav security apparatus.116 He had 
participated in the preparation of letter bombs addressed to the Yugoslav Consulate in Munich.117 
On 6 August 1976, Miodrag Bošković and his friend Uroš Miličević, both anti-Communist Serbs, were 
assassinated in Brussels.118 In September 1976, the CIA summarized the recent wave of targeted 
killings as follows: 
„In the past two years there have been at least 11 unsolved murders of emigres abroad. Many, if not 
all, were probably ordered by the Yugoslav secret police. Yugoslav officials tend to react 
intemperately to emigre acts of violence, often in ways that undermine Yugoslavia's case as the 
victim of terrorism.“119 
 
Meanwhile, the bad press continued. For example a front page article in The New York Times, 
published on 12 September 1976, mentioned “about 10 political murders of Yugoslavs living abroad 
so far this year”.120 Dolanc was obviously still worried about these developments, as he had a 
particular interest in cultivating friendly relations with the Western powers by reassuring them that 
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Yugoslavia refrained from entering the Soviet bloc.121 Confronted with a suffering international 
reputation of the SFRY, Dolanc developed into an adversary of Herljević. A memo issued on 10 
December 1976 by CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence reported on the frictions between Tito’s 
number one party secretary and the minister of the interior: 
„In June, Dolanc reportedly took the unusual step of criticizing General Franjo Herljevic, the interior 
minister, at a meeting of the collective state presidency. Herljevic received the interior portfolio in 
1974, when Tito ordered an upgrading of the internal security mechanism. Dolanc complained that 
excessive zeal by the police under Herljevic was causing problems at home and hurting Yugoslavia's 
image abroad [!]. Dolanc's complaints apparently fell on deaf ears because subsequent reports 
indicate that the ministry continues to go its own way.“122 
 
While the conflict between Dolanc and Herljević lasted, the security services produced further 
problematic incidents.123 West German police officers arrested an employee of the Croatian state 
security who was on a mission to arrange the assassination of two Croatian militant émigrés (most 
prominently Stjepan Bilandžić – in the words of the FRG ambassador in Belgrade a target of Yugoslav 
“security service efforts to silence him”).124 When confronted by his West German colleagues with 
the murderous measures of the security services, Jovo Miloš of the SDB SSUP pointed to the 
autonomy of the “federalized organs” as an explanation.125 Unimpressed by the international 
complications, Herljević still advocated a relentless counterterrorism.126 Towards the Federal 
Assembly, he boasted himself that between 1975 and 1978 some eighty “diversionist attempts” had 
been averted by Yugoslav security agencies.127 Thus, the continuation of drastic measures seemed 
well-justified. Without any hesitation Herljević spoke in favour of an energetic struggle against any 
kind of opposition. He informed his comrades about an alleged alliance of domestic dissidents with 
the “hostile emigration”, “reactionary circles in the FR Germany and the USA” and “terrorists” 
(namely Gojko Bošnjak and Franjo Goreta).128 
The targeted killings abroad persisted. Bruno Bušić, a prominent member of the Croatian 
National Council, was shot dead in Paris on 16 September 1978.129 Standing trial in Zagreb six years 
before, he had been accused of collaborating with an unspecified foreign intelligence service.130 
After leaving Yugoslavia, Bušić became a focal point of the nationalist network and was officially 
linked to the September 1976 hijacking of a TWA-airliner by Croatian separatists.131 After his death 
the police noted “the third recorded killing of a Croatian militant in France in the past six years”.132 A 
few years later an informant of the Yugoslav secret service underpinned the assumptions that 
Bušić’s assassination originated from Yugoslav state organs – he confessed having rejected an order 
to assassinate the exiled Croat.133 
Around early 1980, the Croatian state security blackmailed a Yugoslav citizen in the FRG to 
murder Goreta.134 In late 1979 a Croat told the authorities that he had been induced to kill certain 
compatriots in the FRG, among them Bošnjak.135 Several cases of attempts to recruit hit men for the 
SDB became public.136 In August 1979 the FBI reported to the U.S. Senate that the Yugoslav secret 
service played a key role in “harassment, intimidation and, perhaps, assassination”.137 Nikola 
Miličević had been repeatedly sentenced by West German courts for the illegal possession of 
firearms and other offences. He was a founding member of the splinter organization United 
Croatians of Europe. Although Yugoslav officials held him responsible for terrorist attacks, the 
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Frankfurt Supreme Court rejected the extradition requests.138 In January 1980, he was shot near his 
home in Frankfurt. Investigators of the Federal Criminal Office expressed their doubts “that a killer 
squad on order from above” had been at work. To them it seemed more probable “that lower 
ranking ‘UDBA’-people from the camp of the hawks had operated independently”.139 Yugoslav 
officials considered Dušan Sedlar’s royalist organization Serbian National Defence, having some 270 
members in the FRG, as dangerous.140 Stanko Čolak, chief of the SDB’s anti-emigration department 
in Belgrade, told his West German liaison about a militant “Sedlar group” which allegedly used 
British army bases for “operations against Yugoslavia”.141 Sedlar was shot in Düsseldorf on 16 April 
1980.142 A CIA memo summarized the situation as follows: „Belgrade pursues an intense anti-
terrorist program at home and abroad that has included diplomatic pressure, propaganda to 
discredit emigre organizations [... end of sentence censored]. [...] Should emigre organizations 
initiate terrorist activities it is likely they will be met with equally harsh countermeasures.“143 
That the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order served as a smokescreen to calm 
the consciences of the official Belgrade became apparent by a reaction of Veselin Đuranović, the 
Yugoslav PM, when his West German colleague in a confidential talk addressed the activities of 
Yugoslav secret services in the FRG. From Đuranović’s point of view, the problem of insufficient 
control (which he dated back to the time before 1966) was solved with the establishment of the 
governmental control body.144 The Yugoslav leadership, he claimed, “was aware of the dangers an 
uncontrolled activity of the services abroad” would involve. He alleged that Bakarić, the infirm 
partisan veteran who presided over the Council, would never agree to illegal actions of the secret 
services.145 This was probably true, but Bakarić aggravated the fight against militant exiles while 
frightening the Central Committee with the scenario of some 2,000 “terrorists” abroad.146 Only a 
few weeks after both heads of government had held their talk, Herljević visited Bonn and continued 
to demand a zero tolerance policy against anti-Yugoslav “terrorist elements”.147 
After Tito’s death (in the words of extremist émigrés “Day X”) the targeted killings intensified.148 
In a public speech on 18 May 1980, two weeks after Tito had died, Jure Bilić, president of the 
Croatian parliament, warned of “terrorism and crime” from extremist emigrants.149 On 19 June 
1981, the militant Serbian émigré writer Dragiša Kasiković and the 9-year-old witness Ivanka 
Milošević were killed in Chicago.150 Already in late 1976, Yugoslav representatives had linked Ante 
Kostić to a group of terrorists apprehended in Zagreb.151 He was sentenced for violations of firearms 
restrictions, but after being released, Čolak informed the West German embassy in Belgrade that 
Kostić was about to carry out “a spectacular action”.152 On the early morning of 9 October 1981, 
Kostić was killed in front of his home in Munich.153 The SDB linked the killing of another Croat, 
Stanko Nižić, in Zurich to trafficking of explosives for the „Croatian Revolutionary Movement”.154 
 
6. Turning the Tide: Stane Dolanc as New Secretary of Internal Affairs 
In 1981, riots broke out in the Albanian-inhabited Kosovo province of Serbia, shifting the focus of 
the SDB to exiles from that region.155 Heavily injured, Rasim Zenelaj survived an assassination 
attempt. On trial in Frankfurt, the perpetrator confessed having acted on behalf of the Yugoslav 
secret service.156 Zenelaj was an Albanian activist for Kosovo’s national independence from Serbia – 
as was Ibrahim Vehbi, killed in Brussels (also in 1981).157 In early 1982, three oppositional Kosovo-
Albanian activists were shot at once in the FRG. One of the victims gave a clue by whispering 
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“UDBA” shortly before he died.158 The new series of killings provoked critical reports in the West 
German media which the politicians could hardly ignore. In an address to the Bonn parliament, the 
conservative opposition confronted the public with the issue.159 
This was particularly inconvenient as Yugoslavia relied on the sympathy of the West. The 
socialist state was heavily indebted and needed the assistance of countries like the FRG for a 
prolongation of foreign credits.160 Dolanc as the darling of the West had some reason to worry that 
the adventures of the security services might taint the goodwill of the international partners. When 
he took over the Secretariat of the Interior in May 1982, he intended to weed out the “wild 
disorder” which apparently had occurred under his predecessor Herljević.161 An assessment of the 
CIA described the hopes raised with the replacement of Herljević as follows: 
„The Yugoslav Government officially denies that it employs killer squads or hired assassins to keep its 
emigres cowed, and the West German Government rarely obtains conclusive proof of Yugoslav 
Government complicity in any particular attack on an emigre. Nevertheless, the pattern of events 
and the thrust of available evidence have convinced the Germans that the Yugoslav security service 
has been behind many of the killings. […] 
In the spring of 1981, FRG Interior Minister [Gerhart] Baum met with his Yugoslav counterpart 
[Herljevic] to complain about the activities of the Yugoslav service in West Germany. The latter 
indicated that Belgrade was unwilling to cease these activities unless Bonn would take further action 
to restrict the political activities of Yugoslav emigre groups. Baum could only reply that German 
security officials were already taking all measures available to them under the law. 
Stane Dolanc, Yugoslavia's new Interior Minister, will probably be more responsive to Bonn's 
concerns. He has long had close ties to West German Social Democrats and generally seeks improved 
relations with the West. To be effective, however, Dolanc must succeed in imposing his will over the 
security service, which has had a reputation for independent initiative.“162 
 
Dolanc frequently visited “Free West Germany” (as he used to call it), where he cultivated close 
contacts to leading Social Democrats.163 During the complications between Yugoslavia and the FRG 
over the exchange of West German left-wing and Croatian separatist militants in 1978, he tried to 
mediate.164 After the negotiations had failed, Dolanc “argued successfully for a moderate Yugoslav 
reaction to the FRG decision to refuse extradition”.165 In his capacity as number one secretary of the 
LCY (until 1979), he played a key role in Yugoslavia’s friendly relations to the West – almost as an 
informal foreign minister.166 He developed into a guarantor of suppressing pro-Soviet elements in 
Yugoslavia.167 The CIA considered him “most wary of the USSR”.168 Moreover, for the U.S. 
ambassador in Belgrade, Dolanc was “a political animal of the first order” who “keeps a careful eye 
on the east”.169 
The course of events indicates that Dolanc had a hard time bringing the state security services in 
line with foreign policy goals. While being only a few months in charge of the Internal Affairs, the 
SDB created another embarrassing situation. After the anti-Yugoslav militant Luka Kraljević had been 
attacked by strangers in his Bavarian home on 20 August 1982, two guns which originated from the 
SSUP were found on the escape route. Obviously they had been dropped by the agents who had 
panicked when Kraljević and his wife resisted the intruders. Another trace leading to Yugoslavia was 
the car rented by the agents and returned to Belgrade.170 An involvement of the Bosnian SDB seems 
likely since in the advance of the assault, the chief of the Centre in Mostar sent photographs of 
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Kraljević to his colleagues in Sarajevo.171 Prior to the attempt, Kraljević had repeatedly received 
phone calls from a state security officer in Mostar trying to recruit him as an informer.172 
The periodical „security estimates“, compiled by the SDB SSUP, spotted the so-called „Augsburg 
group“ around Kraljević and Đuro Zagajski as “making intense preparations for the execution of 
terror acts during the spring and summer of 1983”.173 Zagajski, a member of the „Croatian 
Revolutionary Movement” for the procurement of explosives, was found beaten to death near 
Munich on 26 March 1983.174 Another victim was Stjepan Đureković, a manager of Croatia’s biggest 
oil company, who for reasons of political dissent and fears of being discovered as a spy of the West 
German secret service moved to Munich.175 In late September 1982, the Croatian Secretary of the 
Interior announced that Đureković was “involved in subversive activities by an anti-Yugoslav 
terrorist organization of World-War-Two Ustashi émigrés”.176 This allegation seemed verified when 
the Yugoslav security organs noticed Đureković’s article in a paper with Ustaša leanings, 
recommending an uprising for the establishment of a Greater Croatian state.177 Hence, the SDB 
classified him as „motivator of the emigration for the execution of specific actions”.178 
Almost ten years after Đureković’s murder in July 1983, Čolak’s successor as chief of the anti-
emigration department of the SDB SSUP remembered how Dolanc commented on the event: “After 
this the Germans will send us to hell. We have to stop it. In the past we have done some stupid 
things. That’s what I told Franjo [Herljević] right to his face.”179 Dolanc was obviously not the only 
politician worried about a deterioration of the relations with the West. When a delegate of the 
Yugoslav parliament asked about the reactions from abroad, the Deputy Secretary of the Interior 
took the opportunity for a public denial. Following the routine, he explained the incident with the 
fabrication of bloody feuds among the extreme nationalists.180 After a second assassination attempt 
was made on Kraljević in late 1983, leaving him blinded, Dolanc said on TV that “we are absolutely 
not interested in this kind of actions”.181 For more than a decade already, Dolanc pleaded for the 
strengthening of a supervising body on federal level.182 An analysis by the CIA described how Dolanc 
worked towards a closer coordination of the Yugoslav security services by the SDB SSUP: 
“The leadership's efforts to enhance federal control so far have had only marginal success, and the 
conflict between federal and regional security interests continues unresolved. […] The federal 
government in March 1984 passed legislation that returns to it some of the authority in regional 
security matters that it lost over the last 18 years. […] Advocates of the legislation, primarily former 
Interior Minister Dolanc, argue that sole reliance on information from local security organs would be 
disastrous, as apparently was the case before the Kosovo riots in 1981.”183 
 
Priority was given to domestic requirements, but also the foreign operations were affected by the 
modified regulations on the relations between the Yugoslav state security services. In mid-May 
1984, Dolanc changed from top of the SSUP to the state presidency. In the parallel position as head 
of the Federal Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, which was given more power 
over the SDB, he hoped to be able to provide enough backup to the reform policy of his successor 
Dobroslav Čulafić (the new Secretary of the SSUP).184 The specialists of the CIA, however, assumed 
that the “federal Interior Ministry, aside from the small gain made under the 1984 Law on State 
Security, does not appear likely to recover much control or leverage over its regional 
counterparts”.185 An internal SSUP report of October 1984, which stated that the regional services 
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still withheld relevant information from the federal SDB, adds credibility to the assumption of the 
CIA. The SSUP report attached great importance to forwarding data about terrorist threats, enabling 
the security services to take operational steps. A considerable share of the operational 
communication was conducted orally. The SDB SSUP concluded that it did not get the whole picture 
on “all measures taken against […] enemies” (like “sending agents to call on extremists with the aim 
of making them passive”).186 
Apart from the continuing deficit of centralized control, Dolanc at least had some influence on 
the methods of the SDB. Whereas the hardliner Herljević had pleaded for offensive measures, 
Dolanc requested the security services to refrain from the excessive use of force.187 Instead of 
advocating actions modelled after military examples, he initiated an intensified information 
exchange with foreign security agencies.188 As can be seen by the annual report of the Bosnian SDB 
for 1986, where an emphasis was laid on the non-violent disruption of the hostile emigration (e.g. 
by campaigns of defamation), the new softened course was followed.189 On the other hand, Dolanc 
was no exception in taking the émigré threat seriously.190 Like most of his comrades, he believed in 
the dangerous constellation of a “special war”, according to which Yugoslavia was under attack by a 
crossover combination of enemies.191 
 
Closing Remarks: Top-Down Command or Autonomous Decision-Making? 
The relations of Yugoslavia’s political leadership with the state security were somewhat ambivalent. 
On the one hand, the politicians expected from the intelligence services to keep the émigré 
challenge in check. It came, however, as no surprise that the number of targeted killings increased 
significantly in the late 1960s. These years stood for a climax of liberalization in domestic politics. 
While Yugoslavia experienced new openness, the mode of rule changed from totalitarian to 
authoritarian.192 In this situation, the security services shifted the focus of their activities to the 
militant opponents abroad, providing an outlet for repression.193 This distracted the attention of the 
suppressive organs away from the domestic sphere, lowering the risk of persecuting members of the 
LCY. As the history of recent purges demonstrated, the Yugoslav communists were not totally safe 
from internal strife. Still in 1975, Tito raised with his comrades the scenario of reopening the Goli 
otok camp.194 How much LCY members feared becoming targets of the SDB can be assessed by the 
regulations of 1967 that defined the party personnel as a sensitive area for state security 
surveillances.195 
Against this background, the interventions against militant opponents in foreign countries – 
though sometimes controversial – became instrumental. Under the impression of constant violent 
acts from right-wing émigrés, the Yugoslav leadership frequently encouraged its state security to 
curb the hostile activities. The constellation of the “special war” potentiated the endangerment 
represented by the anti-Yugoslav exiles. Eventually, the attack of June/July 1972 had a catalyst 
effect on the targeted killings abroad.196 
At the centre of this complex stood the problem of insufficient political control over the 
operations of the security services. The targeted killings rather appear as a symptom of insufficient 
government control than as the result of orders from above. The top leaders, however, had differing 
attitudes on preventive counterterrorism. This can be clearly seen by the antagonism of Dolanc and 
Herljević. Whereas Dolanc explicitly rejected the lethal activities in Western countries, Herljević at 
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least supported these drastic measures. However, this examination is focused on the federal level of 
Yugoslavia. Because the autonomous decision-making of the Yugoslav republics was a decisive factor 
in state security matters, this dimension still deserves more scholarly attention. 
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